Pseudo operations are international recognized strategy for confronting insurgence. Pseudo operations are actions, in which specially trained and equipped counterinsurgency forces disguise themselves as insurgent bands in order to acquire intelligence, carry out targeting and attacks against insurgent forces or facilities, capture or kill insurgent leaders, conduct psychological operations against the insurgents, and persuade insurgents to turn against themselves and their course.
A pseudo operation is a
universally acclaimed ruse war – a tactics that has been used throughout
military history and has been accepted as legitimate as long as certain
restraints are maintained. These restraints, which centered on international
armed conflicts and the use of enemy flag, military symbols, uniforms etc., are
beyond the scope of this essay.
Pseudo operations are recognized
security strategy sanctioned by the Geneva Convention of 1949. According to the
Protocol Addition to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949 and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol
I) art 37 (2), ruses are “acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to
induce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law
applicable in armed combat and which are not perfidious because they do not
invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that law”
A properly planned and carefully
executed pseudo operation by counterinsurgency forces has always defeated insurgents.
A good example is the use of pseudo operation by the Philippine Government
against the Huk insurrection from the initial encounter between the Huks and
Philippine Military in May 1946 to the surrender of the Huk leader, Luis Taruc
in May 1954, which ended the insurrection.
Between 1948 and 1954, the
Philippine Government was confronted with the problem of the Hukbo ng Baayan Laban sa Hapon, or
“Anti-Japanese Army” insurgency that was formed in 1942 by the merger of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and various socialist organizations in the
country.
Exploiting the dissatisfaction of
many Filipinos with the policies of the central Government they opted for war
and therefore changed their name to Hukbong
Magapalaya ng Bayan, that is, “People’s Libration Army”, with the aim of
overthrowing the central Government.
All through the subsequent
conflict, the group was generally referred to by the abridged form of its
original name, Hukbalahap, and its
members were simply called “Huks”, disclosed Lawrence M. Greenberg.
The Hukbalahap insurgency centered on a region in central Luzon near
Mount Arayat that later turned out to be called, “Huklandia”. There were other smaller independent groups that
operated in southern Luzon. After the death of the leader of one of these
groups, they joined forces with Huks in central Luzon.
However, in April, 1948 to be
précised, a skirmish between the southern Huk group and a company of the
Philippine Constabulary that had caused casualties on both sides was reported.
The central Government cashed into the situation to execute its counterinsurgency
operations using pseudo forces.
Few days later, the remnants of
the southern Huk force arrived in Huklandia carrying with them two members with
gunshot wounds. Because there was no way of verifying the authenticity of the southern
group, the northern group subjected these new insurgents to a detailed
interrogation. Certified that they were what they claimed to be, the two groups
fraternized and exchanged details and other information. The northern group fed
and cared for their new reinforcements especially the injured.
On the fourth day of their
arrival, members of the southern group noticed a change in the attitude among
their northern comrades. Realizing that they are outnumbered three to one and
afraid of what the bigger group might be planning, the southern group swiftly
opened fire on the northern Huks, killing 84 of them, including three
commanders.
The fact of the matter is that
what seemed to be an unfortunate friendly-fire incident was nothing of the
sort. The southern Huk group was a specially trained counter-guerrilla platoon
from the Philippine Constabulary known as Force X.
It was Colonel Napoleon
Valeriano, Commander of a special Philippine Constabulary Unit at the time that
initiated the use of the Force X. After its initial successful use, the pseudo
operations gradually gave way to more conventional counterinsurgency tactics.
In 1951, the Philippine Secretary
of National Defence, Ramon Magsaysay, a veteran of guerilla operations against
the Japanese in World War II, revitalized pseudo operations. During this
period, the Philippine Army employed companies pretending to be Huks Squadrons
in operations that were known as “Large Unit Infiltrations” (LUIs) but as those
operations recorded success, the Huks became increasingly suspicious of Large
Units. Then, the army started to use smaller teams in their pseudo operations.
The use of smaller group was not
without its own troubles. The need for better training emerged. In addition to
providing the required skills and competence to the smaller team, the
Philippine Constabulary increased its reliance on captured Huks to supply the
information needed to keep the pseudo units current concerning Huks operating
procedures. As the insurrection began to wind down in 1954, pseudo operation
was employed only routinely by a specially trained unit known as A-H for à la Huk.
Employing Pseudo
Operations in Nigeria
In
considering whether to employ pseudo operations in Nigeria, certain basic
issues need clarifications. These are: the organization to carry out the pseudo
operations, training of the personnel, command and control of the forces to be
used for the pseudo operations, the types of missions to be assigned, types of
incentives and motivations to capture and sustain loyalty and, legal implication
of conducting pseudo operations and criteria for overall evaluation of the
effectiveness of pseudo operations.
Organization
Every
pseudo operation forces employed a mix of individuals loyal to the Government
and former insurgents who agreed to change sides after being captured. Given
the nature of the Boko Haram, and the various smaller insurgent groups in
Nigeria, the probability of significant numbers of captured personnel agreeing
to fight against their former comrades would appear unlikely. The Boko Haram
sect is believed to comprise mostly of disgruntled elements of Nigeria, Niger
Republic, Chad, Cameroon, and Mali origin, tied together by common enemy,
religion, culture and principally ideology. To win their loyalty and sustain it
is a Herculean task. Individuals responsible for creating pseudo forces are
usually faced with concerns about the eventual loyalty of turned insurgents. These
concerns have been proved to be largely unwarranted. Majority of former
insurgents have demonstrated their loyalties in combat and many have also given
their lives in the service of their newly adopted causes as in the case cited
above.
The universal formula for
converting captured insurgent was put forward by Frank Kitson, a British
Officer who served as Field Intelligence Assistant during the Mau Mau uprising
in Kenya from the declaration of a state of emergency in October 1952 to
Kenya’s independence in December 1963 (now a retired British General). The
factors he advanced that must be brought to play in order to make a man change
his allegiance includes:
1.
Incentives: He must be
given an incentive that is strong enough to make him want to do so. This is
what former President Olusegun Obasanjo called “carrot”.
2.
Punishment: He must be
made to realize that failure will result in something unpleasant happening to
him. This, former President Obasanjo referred to as “stick”.
3.
Opportunity: He must be
given reasonable opportunity of proving to himself and to his friends that
there is nothing fundamentally dishonorable about his actions.
The process of creating and
sustain this trusting relationship depends on how the captured insurgent in
treated. According to Kitson, in Kenya, the British used a three-stage approach
of initially treating a captured insurgent harshly and then gradually relaxing
the pressure. In this aspect, Kitson said, “From
the stage three it was essential that the man should feel that he was trusted. Once
he had joined us there were no reservations. He could sleep with the others,
carry arms, do sentry duty or go out by himself. Frequently on one of his first
patrols Eric or I would give him our pistol and carry only a simi (a Kenya
knife) to make him realize that he was absolutely one of the team”.
The dazzling of the carrot in the form of attractive
incentives and the raising of the stick
in the form of emergency laws that imposed severe penalties for such violations
as possessing firearms and belonging to subversive organizations are two side
of the same coin that if well managed can make the difference in the fight
against terrorism in Nigeria. Captured insurgents who refused to cooperate
should be turned over to the Police, where they are to face the possibility of
long prison sentences or even hanging. By opening an escape window and managing
it wisely and advantageously many captured insurgents will seize the
opportunity and choose to support the Federal Government.
The Federal Government have taken
a bold step towards putting in place an organizational structure by the
enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2011 and the establishment
of the Office of National Security Adviser (NSA) as the Coordinating body for counterterrorism
activities in the country. Apart from overhauling the system of confusions that
hitherto bedeviled law enforcement and security agencies’ response to terrorism
and other violent crimes in the country, it provides the platform for the organization
of pseudo forces and effective use of conventional counterinsurgency tactics. These
arrangements, if wisely and effectively exploited, will reduce propaganda
attacks and guide against unnecessary accusations.
Training
Apart
from working with other members of the counterinsurgency forces in pseudo platoons,
former insurgents play vital roles in training. Success of any pseudo operation
and safety of the individuals executing it depend on their ability to sale
themselves as genuine insurgents. In our case study, we discovered that the Huks
insurgents became extremely suspicious of alleged insurgent units and therefore
subjected the Philippines Force X to intensive interrogation before accepting
them. A wrong phrase or lack o knowledge about the camp where they had received
training or even the latest insurgent songs and slogans could lead to sudden
death. Napoleon D. Valeriano revealed
that the members of the Philippines Force X learned after their first operation
that the Huks had became suspicious of them because they had too much bright
new ammunition for a genuine insurgent unit and they acted fast. It is only a
former insurgent that could provide the required information to check such mistakes.
Newly captured insurgents are indispensable to keep the necessary information for
pseudo operations up to date.
Since pseudo forces tend to
develop in an ad hoc manner, their training follows likewise. Some of the
outstanding examples of formal pseudo forces training include that of the
Philippines 7th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) under the command of
Colonel Valeriano. He created a secret training base in Sierra Madre and
instituted a rigorous eight-week course to prepare his men to operate as Huks. In
Kenya, Kitson was said to have build a training center where his counter-gangs
were trained in secrecy, infiltration and blending tactics.
Command and Control
When
we examine command and control of pseudo operations the first thing that comes
to focus is determining what part of a nation’s security apparatus will control
both the force and operations. In the Philippines, pseudo operations were
originally considered a law enforcement issue and placed under the Philippines
Constabulary, which was in charge of counterinsurgency. However, when Ramon
Magsaysay assumed as Secretary of National Defence in 1950, he, as part of
reorganization, placed the Philippines Constabulary under military control all
through the campaign against the Huks. This development boosts pseudo
operations and triggers the collapse of the Huks insurgence.
In the same vein, in Kenya,
General Sir George Erskine adopted a joint task force made up of army and
police representatives under the leadership of Provincial and District
Commissioners that executed pseudo operations against the Mau Mau. These
committees controlled the activities of security forces, including pseudo
units, in their areas. Kitson observed that this arrangement was sustained
until 1955 when the responsibility for pseudo operations was centralized in a
“Special Force” command.
Complications are inevitable,
especially where pseudo forces are given the extra responsibility to cover both
internal and external operations as was the case with Selous Scouts of
Rhodesia. Major Ron Reid Daly pointed out that initially the Selous Scout
received instructions from a variety of military, police and intelligence
organizations. To lessen the inevitable problems caused by a split command
system, a Combined Operations Headquarters was established in 1977 to direct
the war, including control of the Selous Scouts.
Fratricide incident is another
command and control issue requiring due consideration as far as pseudo
operation is concern. The possibility of killing people of your group or
country is very high in pseudo operations and in most cases such incidents are
never reported due to the secret nature of the operation. The method used to
reduce the possibility of fratricide incident was to designate an area in which
one unit is operating as “frozen”. But, it has been proved that mistakes are
inevitable. Major Daly revealed that in June 1978, a Selous Scout operating
officer failed to correctly designate a frozen area, which resulted in a police
antiterrorist unit engaging and killing four Selous Scouts acting as
insurgents. Due to the secrecy of their operations the Selous Scouts could not
report the misstep to the police.
Mission
A
proper delineation of missions for the pseudo officers is as important as the
operation itself. In most cases, the top three missions in order of
significance are to:
1.
Kill
leaders of insurgents or outstanding extremist.
2.
Destroy
their elite units.
3.
Penetrate
and destroy their effective support units.
Most recorded success in pseudo
operations derived from the realization that a counterinsurgent team operating
in very small group makes it possible for contacts with real insurgents to
occur. Once such contacts occur, the reaction depends
largely on the situation. In most cases, the counterinsurgent unit withdraws to
notify the police or military units stationed nearby which moves in to kill or
capture the insurgents. In counterinsurgency operation high premium is placed
on capturing insurgents instead of eliminating them. Establishing the trade-off
between using pseudo forces for offensive and for intelligence gathering is
essential to avoid the temptation of rashly using the information for offensive
purposes instead of acting rationally in the circumstance.
The pseudo force’s roles in our
situation would be to tactically infiltrate not only the Boko Haram terrorist
network but also the population, pin point the terrorist camps and bases and
then direct conventional forces in to carry out the real attacks. In the case of Rhodesia Major Daly reported
that 68 percent of the insurgents killed died as a result of direct or indirect
action by the Selous Scouts.
The psychological impact of
pseudo operations on insurgents has been known to far outweigh the physical
damage. One of the natures of insurgency is to cause its practitioners to
become extremely security conscious and feeling of fear. The very knowledge of
the existence of pseudo forces in an area reinforces a feeling of paranoia. The
consequential suspicion of any armed group increases the chances of insurgents
accidentally engaging other insurgents and to starve themselves of recruits and
supplies from new sources.
Legal
The
legal aspects of pseudo operations are beyond the scope of this essay. However,
let it be pointed out here that any consideration for pseudo operations must
take into account the applicable laws of armed conflict, especially where it
involves international armed conflict.
If the action is a police action, then these tactics would fall within the
laws of the state initiating the pseudo, but if such actions are taken in a civil
war or during a belligerent military occupation
then those who participate in such actions would not be privileged belligerents.
The principle of plausible deniability is usually
applied for pseudo-teams in accordance with laws of war.
Conclusion
Pseudo operations have been
described by Lawrence E. Cline, a retired US Army intelligence
officer, as “the use of organized teams which are disguised as guerrilla
groups for long- or short-term penetration of insurgent-controlled
areas."
Pseudo Operations should be
distinguished, notes Cline, from the more common police or
intelligence infiltration of guerrilla or criminal organizations. In
the latter case, infiltration is normally done by individuals. Pseudo units, on
the other hand, are formed as needed from organized units, usually military or paramilitary.
Pseudo operation is a valuable
tool that if used wisely and selectively by our police and military forces can
defeat Boko Haram and other insurgent groups now and in future. Though it is
not a standalone technique, its effectiveness is derivable only when applied in
coordination with other conventional techniques. Again, based on the peculiar nature of
Nigeria, our ethnic and linguistic diversity and socio-cultural divides, no
police or military techniques will be successful if not used in support of a
larger political strategy designed to deal with the causes of the insurgency in the country.
Despite the inherent liabilities
associated with pseudo operations, they have proved to be the hallmark of a
number of successful counterinsurgency campaigns and deserved to be made an
integral part of Nigeria’s counterinsurgency force’s repertoire. The Anti-Terrorism Act 2011 which was recently passed into
law and the legalization of the Office of National Security Adviser (NSA) as
the Coordinating body for counterterrorism activities in the country are added
advantages in an effort to create a special pseudo force and use it to check
terrorists and perpetrators of insecurity in Nigeria.
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